Retraction note: Ríos-Caro, T. E., León Rodríguez, J. A., Coronel-Zubiate, F. T., Ríos-Angulo, C. M. & Ríos-Caro, M. C. (2023). Teleodontology in the Central Peruvian Jungle: Quality and Service Satisfaction. HUMAN REVIEW. International Humanities Revista Internacional De Humanidades, 21(2), 223-235. https://doi.org/10.37467/revhuman.v21.5049 The Editorial Office of Eurasia Academic Publishing Group has retracted this article. An investigation carried out by our Research Integrity Department has found a group of articles, among which this one is found, that are not within the (...) thematic scope of the journal. We believe that the editorial process was manipulated and, furthermore, acceptance decisions were made under possibly inappropriate peer review. (shrink)

Uma das peculiaridades instigantes desse livro, caro leitor, é a sobreposição dos temas, que desdobram e estratificam leituras preparadas por especialistas de diversas áreas de conhecimento. Penetrando no mesmo tema por diversas perspectivas, quem o lê se aproxima não somente de Max Weber, mas acaba se familiarizando, inclusive, com o modo pelo qual seu pensamento está aderido às diversas ciências que ainda hoje procuram compreender a herança da nossa modernidade. Com espírito interdisciplinar, apresentamos a você, leitor, esses textos oriundos (...) de pesquisadores de diferentes disciplinas. E se pedimos a sua leitura, é porque consideramos que eles representam um bom exemplo da atual produção latino-americana da Weberforschung. (shrink)

This is the first collection to present a comprehensive overview of liberal naturalism. Essential reading for students and researchers in all areas of philosophy it will be of particular interest for those studying philosophical naturalism, philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophy of mind and ethics.

The recent discussions on the unity of virtue suffer from a lack of reference to the processes through which we interpret each other as moral agents. In the present paper it is argued that much light can be thrown on that crucial issue by appealing to a version of Donald Davidson’s Principle of Charity, which we call “Principle of Phronetic Charity”. The idea is that in order to treat somebody as a moral agent, one has first to attribute to them, (...) at least pro tempore, a significant degree of practical wisdom and, then, to assess and rationally adjust such attribution of competence via actual engagement with them – a process that may lead to different responses on the part of the interpreter. After expounding and defending the Principle of Phronetic Charity and the interpretive practices connected with it, we discuss the repercussions of our account on the issue of the epistemic access to virtue. We will show, in particular, that some important components of both disunitarianism and unitarianism have to be retained: in accordance with the former, we stress the role of concrete experience over pure speculation and, up to a point, the idea that virtues tend to form variegated ensembles; in accordance with the latter, we accept the claim that virtues are not attributed to moral agents in isolation. Ultimately, however, the account developed here rejects both the atomism of the disunitarian view and the holism of the “Unity of the Virtues”, since it is in fact a form of molecularism, according to which virtues come neither individually nor as a whole, but rather as clusters. (shrink)

In the last few decades, the relevance of quantum mechanics to the free-will debate has been discussed at length, especially in relation to the prospects of libertarianism. Basing his interpretation on Anscombe’s seminal work, Putnam argued in 1979 that, given that quantum mechanical indeterminacy is holistic at the macrolevel—i.e., it is not traceable to atomistic events such as quantum jumps of single atoms—it can provide libertarians with the kind of freedom they seek. As shown in this article, however, Putnam ultimately (...) reached the conclusion—together with the other author of this article—that his argument was wrong due to problems with the way it appealed to the Uncertainty Principle.**. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, we will discuss the much debated question of the source of normativity (which traditionally has nature and practical reason as the two main contenders to this role) and propose a new answer to it. Second, in answering this question, we will present a new account of practical wisdom, which conceives of the ethical virtues as ultimately unified in the chief virtue of phronesis, understood as ethical expertise. To do so, we (...) will first criticize the main current view of phronesis and its bearer (the phronimos), then offer another view of the nature of phronesis and of its relation to the other ethical virtues. Our proposal should not be intended as an interpretation of Aristotle’s own view; rather, it should be seen as a broadly Aristotelian theoretical proposal, which we believe can satisfyingly address most of the problems that afflict the more traditional accounts of practical wisdom. In section 2 of this paper, after criticizing first-nature naturalistic views of moral virtue, we take practical reason to be the cornerstone of second-nature naturalistic views; in section 3, we will outline criticisms to which, in our view, the traditional views of phronesis are ill-suited to respond, and, in section 4, we will outline our view of phronesis as ethical expertise – a view which in our view is immune to the above-mentioned criticisms – by spelling out the three main tenets of phronesis as ethical expertise: a conceptual thesis, an epistemic thesis, and the educational implications of the two. Finally, we will support our proposal with some empirical evidence taken from cognitive science. (shrink)

Practical wisdom eliminativism has recently been proposed in both philosophy and psychology, on the grounds of the alleged redundancy of practical wisdom (Miller 2021 ) and its purported developmental/psychological implausibility (Lapsley 2021 ). Here we respond to these challenges by drawing on an improved version of a view of practical wisdom, the “Aretai model”, that we have presented elsewhere (De Caro et al. 2021 ; Vaccarezza et al. 2023 ; De Caro et al. forthcoming ). According to this (...) model, practical wisdom is conceptualized: (i) as virtuousness _tout court_, i.e., as the _ratio essendi_ of the virtues, and (ii) as a form of ethical expertise. By appealing to the first thesis, we counter the charge of psychological implausibility, while we rely on the second thesis to address the accusation of redundancy. In conclusion we argue that the Aretai model implies a significant paradigm shift in virtue ethics. Practical wisdom emerges as both necessary and sufficient for virtuousness, thereby downsizing – without eliminating entirely – the role that individual virtues play in our ethical lives. (shrink)

This volume presents a group of leading thinkers who criticize scientific naturalism not in the name of some form of supernaturalism, but in order to defend a ...

This article discusses Hilary Putnam's views on the mind-body problem, by locating them in the general context of a satisfying pluralistic naturalism that he tried to articulate throughout his entire philosophical career. The first attempt in this direction was computational functionalism, his version of psychological functionalism centered on the analogy between mind/body and software/hardware, which (differently from David Lewis and others) he came to think of as an empirical hypothesis. That was a very successful proposal; however, later Putnam abandoned it (...) and embraced what he called 'liberal functionalism'. The reason for this change of mind was twofold: on the one hand, Putnam reached the conclusion that computational functionalism was incompatible with his views on semantic externalism; on the other hand, he began to think that mental states, besides being compositionally plastic (i.e., two entities can be in the same psychological state without being in the same physical state), are also computationally plastic (i.e., two entities can be in the same psychological state without being in the same functional state).In conclusion, I will argue that 'liberal functionalism' opened an interesting perspective for a successful non-reductive version of naturalism. (shrink)

Normativity concerns what we ought to think or do and the evaluations we make. For example, we say that we ought to think consistently, we ought to keep our promises, or that Mozart is a better composer than Salieri. Yet what philosophical moral can we draw from the apparent absence of normativity in the scientific image of the world? For scientific naturalists, the moral is that the normative must be reduced to the nonnormative, while for nonnaturalists, the moral is that (...) there must be a transcendent realm of norms. _Naturalism and Normativity_ engages with both sides of this debate. Essays explore philosophical options for understanding normativity in the space between scientific naturalism and Platonic supernaturalism. They articulate a liberal conception of philosophy that is neither reducible to the sciences nor completely independent of them—yet one that maintains the right to call itself naturalism. Contributors think in new ways about the relations among the scientific worldview, our experience of norms and values, and our movements in the space of reason. Detailed discussions include the relationship between philosophy and science, physicalism and ontological pluralism, the realm of the ordinary, objectivity and subjectivity, truth and justification, and the liberal naturalisms of Donald Davidson, John Dewey, John McDowell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. (shrink)

_:_ This metacomment on Dennett’s comment on Sam Harris’s book on free will examines two issues. First, how one should conceive of the relationship between philosophy and science, in particular considering the dismissive attitude many highly regarded scientists show towards philosophy today. Second, a critical assessment of Harris’s replies to Dennett’s criticisms. _Keywords:_ Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris; Free Will; Science; Philosophy _In difesa dei vincoli avuncolari. Dennett e Harris sul rapporto tra filosofia e scienza_ _Riassunto:_ Questo metacommento sulle osservazioni avanzate (...) da Dennett sul libro di Sam Harris sul libero arbitrio verte su due questioni. In primo luogo, discute come si dovrebbe concepire il rapporto tra filosofia e scienza, in particolar modo considerando l’atteggiamento sprezzante mostrato oggi nei confronti della filosofia da diversi scienziati molto in vista. In secondo luogo saranno oggetto di valutazione critica le risposte di Harris alle critiche di Dennett. _Parole chiave: _Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris; Libero arbitrio; Scienza; Filosofia. (shrink)

Scientific naturalism—the conception according to which the natural sciences, and possibly physics alone, set the limits of ontology and epistemology—is characterized by a strong monistic tendency. For this reason, all versions of scientific naturalism face the so-called “placement problem”, which concerns the features of the ordinary view of the world that, at least prima facie, do not fit into the scientific view of the world (think of consciousness, moral properties, free will, and intentionality). To address this problem, scientific naturalists use (...) three strategies: reductionism, eliminativism, and mysterianism—none of which, it is argued, produces satisfying results. Liberal naturalism opts instead for a pluralistic attitude in both ontology and epistemology but accepts a constraint according to which one should accept no entity or explanation that is incompatible with the scientific worldview. Liberal naturalism faces the “reconciliation problem”, which concerns the relationship between the scientific and the ordinary views of the world once one denies ontological and epistemological priority to either of them. Three strategies for addressing this problem are presented: according to the first, the ordinary worldview and the scientific world are categorically distinct; according to the second, the former emerges from the latter; according to the third, between them there is a relation of global supervenience. Other objections to liberal naturalism are finally presented and addressed. (shrink)

The most common taxonomy of free will theories of free will hinges on the distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism, which respectively assert and deny the compatibility of free will with causal determinism. This is a useful distinction, but it does not throw light on a fundamental aspect of the debate, regarding how the different views conceive of the role that philosophy and science should play in tackling with the free will issue. In this perspective, another taxonomy will be presented and (...) three families of theories will be distinguished: scientific isolationism, interactionism, and philosophical isolationism. In conclusion, it will be argued that interactionism is the right approach. (shrink)

It is very contentious whether the features of the manifest image have a place in the world as it is described by natural science. For the advocates of strict naturalism, this is a serious problem, which has been labelled ‘placement problem’. In this light, some of them try to show that those features are reducible to scientifically acceptable ones. Others, instead, argue that the features of the manifest image are mere illusions and, consequently, have to be eliminated from our ontology. (...) In brief, the two options that are open to strict naturalists for solving the placement problem are ontological reductionism and eliminativism. Other advocates of naturalist philosophy, however, claim that both these strategies fail and, consequently, opt for ‘mysterianism’, the view according to which we cannot give up the recalcitrant features of the manifest image even if we are not able to understand the ways in which they could be reduced to the scientific features. Mysterianism has the merit of facing the difficulties that whoever wants to explain reductively, or explain away, the features of the manifest image encounters. It is also a defeatist philosophical view, though, since it considers the most important philosophical problems as unsolvable mysteries. For this reason, I argue that mysterianism can also be taken as a reductio of strict naturalism, given its presumption that all phenomena are either explainable by the natural sciences or to be rejected as illusory. In this article, it is argued that the failures of reductionism, eliminativism and mysterianism should teach us that both the scientific image and the manifest image of the world are essential and mutually irreducible but not incompatible with each other. To support this claim, in the second part of the article, the case of free will is discussed. (shrink)

This article investigates the ethical requirements and features that characterize the professional life of successful contemporary classical orchestras, with particular focus on the leadership style of their conductors. As we will show, the traditional authoritarian approach, marked by the conductor’s commanding charisma and strict demand for obedience from orchestra members, has evolved today into a more ethically-based transformational style of leadership. This new approach is rooted in principles of respect, voluntary compliance, and trust. The present paper delves into the interpersonal (...) dynamics within contemporary orchestras, focusing specifically on the character traits required to establish trust and collaboration between the conductor and the orchestra members, as well as among the orchestra members themselves. In particular, drawing from recent research in psychology, we underscore the significance of deference, empathy, and shared commitment toward the common goal of excellence in performance. We conclude that the ethics-centered style of leadership adopted by most contemporary conductors may extend beyond the realm of music, offering insights applicable to leaders in various other fields. By fostering deep connections, shared purpose, and collaboration, this approach has the potential to enhance organizational performance and outcomes in general. (shrink)

The study of responsibility in ethics focuses on the nature of agency, accountability, blame, punishment and, crucially, the distribution of responsibility for complex ethical problems. Work in social ontology examines the nature of entities such as groups, organizations, corporations, and institutions, and what it is for these entities to have intentional states and to act. Until recently, these fields of research have mostly been treated separately. The goal of this issue is to examine emerging research at their intersection. The papers (...) gathered here explore both normative dimensions of work in social ontology and metaphysical assumptions and implications of ethical theorizing about collective responsibility. (shrink)

This article investigates the ethical requirements and features that characterize the professional life of successful contemporary classical orchestras, with particular focus on the leadership style of their conductors. As we will show, the traditional authoritarian approach, marked by the conductor’s commanding charisma and strict demand for obedience from orchestra members, has evolved today into a more ethically-based transformational style of leadership. This new approach is rooted in principles of respect, voluntary compliance, and trust. The present paper delves into the interpersonal (...) dynamics within contemporary orchestras, focusing specifically on the character traits required to establish trust and collaboration between the conductor and the orchestra members, as well as among the orchestra members themselves. In particular, drawing from recent research in psychology, we underscore the significance of deference, empathy, and shared commitment toward the common goal of excellence in performance. We conclude that the ethics-centered style of leadership adopted by most contemporary conductors may extend beyond the realm of music, offering insights applicable to leaders in various other fields. By fostering deep connections, shared purpose, and collaboration, this approach has the potential to enhance organizational performance and outcomes in general. (shrink)

The critical concern of the present volume is contemporary naturalism, both in its scientific version and as represented by newly emerging hopes for another, philosophically more liberal, naturalism.1 The papers collected here are state-of-the-art discussions that question the appeal, rational motivations, and presuppositions of scientific naturalism across a broad range of philosophical topics. As an alternative to scientific naturalism, we offer the outlines of a new non- reductive form of naturalism and a more inclusive conception of nature than any provided (...) by the natural sciences. Our authors collectively believe that holding scientific naturalism up for philosophical scrutiny and challenging its misconceptions is of the first importance both for understanding ourselves and our place in the world; and, also, for the future direction of philosophy itself. (shrink)

The article discusses the origin of the split between common sense and the scientific view of the world, which took lace at the beginning of the modern age. More specifically, it shows how Galileo was able to address the two main objections against his mathematically-based scientific realism: that mathematics can not be applied to the material world (since it only works for idealized entities) and that physics is only a useful tool for making predictions, but it does not really describe (...) the natural world nor explain it. Galileo was able to counter those objections, but he did not win his other battle, i.e., to show that the common sense view of the world, based on the idea of the reliability of perception, is illusory. A battle that has not been won by his contemporary followers – (the advocates of scientific naturalism) either. (shrink)

The paper addresses two issues that have been recently debated in the literature on free will, moral responsibility, and the theory of punishment. The first issue concerns the descriptive project, the second both the substantive and the prescriptive project. On theoretical, historical and empirical grounds, we claim that there is no rationale for fearing that the spread of neurocognitive findings will undermine the ordinary practice of responsibility attributions. We hypothetically advocate two opposite views: that such findings would cause the collapse (...) of all punitive practices; that, on the contrary, such findings would open the way to more humane forms of punishment, which would be justified on purely utilitarian grounds. We argue that these views are both wrong, since whereas a sound punitive system can be justified without any reference to moral responsibility, it will certainly not improve the humaneness of punishment. (shrink)

This brief introduction expounds the reasons behind the collection of essays entitled ‘Nature, Value and Normativity’. Political and social philosophers have usually a hard time finding a role for considerations about nature (and human nature in particular) in their accounts of normativity, due to the risk of committing the naturalistic fallacy and/or running against people’s autonomy. Scepticism about appeals to nature in normative accounts of politics and society, however, seems bound to clash with the fact that nature constrains human action. (...) The essays of the collection tackle some specific questions about the role of nature in accounts of value and normativity: the fact–value distinction, the relevance of emotions for normativity and values, the role of intersubjectivity in normative theory, as well as free will and action. (shrink)

In this chapter, we will offer a sketch of the state of the art as concerns existing accounts of virtue acquisition in relation to automaticity. In particular, we will focus on the so-called “skill model,” which we aim to improve by questioning its rather common underlying dualistic picture of the mind. Then we will propose an account of skillful emotions by identifying the features that make them both automatic and embedded in an intelligent practice. Finally, we will show how this (...) view can help the skill model by offering a better description of emotion shaping in virtue acquisition. By doing so, we will contend that emotions contribute autonomously and actively to the skillfulness of the habits in which they are embedded. (shrink)

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 19, Issue 4, Page 624-628, October 2011.